

Introduction

For Great Britain is already too rapidly losing many of the noble ideals and institutions which once made her the unrivalled mistress of the world ... and if the mothers of the British race decide to part altogether with the birthright of their simple *womanliness* for a political mess of pottage, then darker days are in store for the nation than can yet be foreseen or imagined. For with woman alone rests the Home, which is the foundation of the Empire. When they desert this, their God-appointed centre, the core of the national being, then things are tottering to a fall.¹

In 1907, Marie Corelli—phenomenally popular novelist, celebrity, and self-appointed ‘guardian of the public conscience’²—published her much-quoted anti-suffragist text, *Woman, or—Suffragette?* As the pamphlet’s title indicates, the radical suffragist’s transgressions were so great that the line dividing woman and radical feminist was an unbridgeable one. As an incredibly successful writer and public persona, Corelli’s fame was predicated on the sales of 500- or 600-page novels that capitalised on descriptions of the loose and decaying morality of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British society. A particular feature of her writing was her condemnation of the women at the centre of that decaying moral fabric.

Who were these women? In Corelli’s world—and that of her vast army of readers—they were modern or ‘new’ or feminist women. These were the author’s ‘distracted, man-fighting sisters’, who were inspired to go ‘clamouring like unnatural hens in a barn-yard about their “rights” and “wrongs”’, intentionally attempting to ‘neutralise their sex’, and at the very least robbing that sex of its dignity.³ These were shamelessly deviant women, like the notorious New Woman⁴ and the violent suffragettes,⁵ who while fighting publicly for the vote and other such worldly gains only invoked disgrace. Their dangerous and indecorous behaviour, Corelli assented, was ‘a degradation to the very name of woman’.⁶ Devoid of the womanly feelings of modesty and shame, these gender abominations alienated their respectable non-feminist sisters. Even more than that, their deviant actions harmed the nation and empire to which they owed allegiance. These feminist women were, then, ‘a scandal to the nation’ because they made ‘England a laughing-stock to the rest of the world’.⁷ Their selfish desires for political power exposed their inability to be guided by feminine emotional values. Their continued campaigns also threatened to dismantle the entire emotional regimes underpinning the gender

relations of the nation and the Empire, and indeed, of the civilised world.

Corelli's attacks on the feminist woman were steeped in shame. She attempted to shame transgressive women into abandoning their disruptive activities. As a moral and social emotion, shame worked by instilling in individuals a fear of losing the love or respect of someone or some community they were attached to or to whom they attached value. If women valued the communities to which they belonged—gendered and national communities—then they would desist from these acts. Otherwise, they risked being ostracised. However, as feminist theorist Jill Locke explains, shame has its limitations.⁸ If feminists did not honour their connection with the community of 'good' patriotic womanhood, then they were unlikely to be motivated by Corelli's shaming. Therefore, shame performed a number of ideological functions in her writing. It existed to inspire reform. If it could not do this, it was assigned a protective role. It was used to highlight the boundaries existing between the true community of English womanhood and its transgressive other. For anti-suffragist women such as Corelli, shame was a versatile political tool.

Corelli and her fellow female anti-suffragists did not use shame without articulating their wider understanding of the nature and workings of this emotion and related emotional concepts, such as honour, courage, chivalry, and embarrassment. Rather, their collective body of writing reveals much about the complexities of early twentieth-century deliberations on the make-up of gendered emotional regimes. Feminists were considered scandalous because they threatened the nature of the emotional regimes which guided men's and women's behaviour. Men and women were expected to adhere to different sets of emotional standards—those appropriate to their sex. For example, men were required to be honourable in their daily dealings. They were expected to enact the emotional qualities underpinning honour: courage, chivalry, honesty, and fairness. Women, on the other hand, were directed to behave according to a different set of emotional rules. They were expected to be sensitive, loving, and nurturing. Each set of emotional rules reflected the proper place of the sexes in society: men's emotional regimes guided their participation in the public realm and women's were much more suited to their place in the private sphere. When feminists committed public outrages—such as staging mass demonstrations or damaging property in the name of 'Votes for Women'—they threatened to appropriate men's emotional regimes. In doing so, they jeopardised the integrity and operation of those gendered regimes. As Corelli pointed out, this was detrimental to two intersecting communities: womanhood and the nation.

In this book, I undertake the much-neglected task of examining how women deployed emotions in their attempts to regulate the behaviour of other women. In particular, I analyse how politically minded women understood and used shame in their discussions about women's empowerment and disempowerment. I address a series of questions relating to women's articulations and manipulations of shame and related emotions. For example, was shame an empowering tool for the politically disempowered? Did women's deployment of

shame accord with their wider understanding of the gendered nature of emotions and emotional regimes? That is to say, shame and its antithesis, honour, were profoundly gendered emotions: shame was regarded as inescapably feminine, whereas only men could actively pursue honour. Therefore, when defending the integrity of the nation from the perceived feminist onslaught, did 'good' patriotic women act to appropriate a distinctly masculine remit? Did they erode the masculine nature of honour? If so, how did they rationalise such an incursion into masculine emotional regimes? My study of shame extends beyond the question of how women used shame in the attempt to ensure compliance. It also analyses how these women understood the wider nature of emotions and emotional regimes—that is, the emotional context in which shame and shaming operated.

I adopt a national and a transnational approach in this book by drawing on the political writings of patriotic women in other sites of empire—namely, Ireland and Australia. Historians of empire have long had cause to embrace transnational approaches to the past. The essence of empire involves movements and exchanges across national and colonial borders.⁹ How far did concerns about gender, nationalism, and emotions connect or disconnect patriotic women across the British Empire? For example, in the first decades of the twentieth century, all three countries—England, Ireland, and Australia—were undergoing significant degrees of political upheaval uniquely linked to their relative places on the British imperial spectrum. Across these separate but related national sites, concepts of female citizenship diverged. Patriotic women used these varying concepts of female citizenship to maintain or reconstruct their gendered communities. I analyse how far understandings and uses of shame intersected or diverged across these disparate sites. I look at how each community of patriotic womanhood articulated the nature of the emotional contexts in which shame and shaming operated.

Gendered Emotional Regimes and Communities

This book adds to the expansive fields of gender history and the history of nationalisms and imperialism. It also contributes to the more recent, but ever-burgeoning, field of emotions history. Much has been written over the past few decades about what has been termed a history of emotions.¹⁰ The works of prominent scholars such as Barbara Rosenwein and William Reddy are of particular relevance to this study of the emotional values of different communities of patriotic womanhood. In the early 2000s, Rosenwein argued that a given society accommodated numerous emotional communities and that individuals moved through multiple emotional communities daily. The emotional styles, rules, standards, and expectations varied from community to community. Members of each emotional community were expected to adhere to 'the same valuations of emotions and their expression'.¹¹ They were expected to amend their emotional styles to suit the relevant emotional environment. Women

connected by their intertwining views on the relationship between gender and the nation formed a type of emotional community. They identified specific emotional values and styles that women should adhere to in order to be regarded as bona fide members of that gendered national community.

At around the same time, William Reddy formulated the term emotional regimes. He understood emotional regimes to be the set of normative emotions prescribed by societies and governments and the codes of expression and repression (emotives) designed to inculcate and manage those emotions. He argued that such prescribed emotions and codes were required to underpin any stable political regime.¹² Since then, other scholars of emotions have added to and amended those theories. Benno Gammerl, for example, has extended the study of emotional regimes and communities to argue that far from being restrictive or rigidly prescribed, many of these emotional communities were fluid enough to variously cut across or bridge distinctions of class, race, nationality, or gender.¹³ How fluid or rigid were the emotional regimes directing women's participation in nationalist politics? Did groups of patriotic womanhood construct emotional communities that were open and flexible in the face of feminist demands?

In this book, I am concerned with how emotional communities and emotional regimes intersected with national and gendered politics. Despite the obvious presence of emotions in politics, Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta argue that there has been some hesitation on the part of academic observers to admit to the place of emotions in political life. Instead, they have managed to 'ignore the swirl of passions all around them in political life'.¹⁴ In accounting for this relative absence, political scientist Carol Johnson cites the perceived gendered nature of emotions generally. Traditionally, emotion was associated with the feminised private sphere of home and family, while emotion's supposed antithesis, reason, was associated with the masculinised public world of business and politics.¹⁵ I add to the emerging body of literature that works to reject this binary by analysing how women used emotions strategically to achieve political ends. By concentrating on women active in protest movements at the beginning of the twentieth century, I perform the much-needed task of historicising political emotions, specifically shame and its close family of emotions—negative (for example, disgrace, embarrassment, and indignation) and positive (including honour, courage, and chivalry).

A Transnational History of Shame?

Shame is a social and moral emotion. It is the fear of being judged defective by an individual or group to whom one attaches value. It is not simply outwardly directed as, for example, embarrassment might be. It is not the temporary feeling brought about by an accidental

violation of social norms as embarrassment is. Rather, shame is internalised. The fear of shame is the fear of failing not only one's valued community, but through that one's sense of self. Sociologist Thomas Scheff argues that shame is 'the feeling of a *threat to the social bond*'.¹⁶ It is the master emotion, he claims, because people always anticipate failing themselves and their group. Shame is ever-present because as social beings, people fear an erosion of the bonds that tie them to their community.¹⁷ Transgressive subjects could shame themselves by dishonouring their bond with their community. They could also bring shame to that collective if, through their deviant behaviour, they corrupted the values, and therefore the bonds, of that community.

In this book, I look at early twentieth-century women's communities of belonging. I also examine these women's understandings of the perceived threats to their social bonds. Therefore, shame is at the heart of this study. Patriotic women consistently articulated their impressions of shame and its kin as they negotiated these perceived threats. Their communications also reveal that they were adept at identifying shame's complex workings. Shame was a highly versatile social emotion. It had the capacity to act as a motivational tool. If transgressive subjects confronted their shame and reformed their behaviour, they could be accepted back into the fold of their once valued community. However, as a social or political tool, shame was also limited in that it relied on the deviant's ability and desire to accept shame and embrace reform.

Still, and further demonstrating shame's versatility, while accepting the limitations of the reformative power of this emotion, early twentieth-century women also identified the possibility of a positive outcome arising from this process of shaming. If the attempt to inflict shame on transgressive subjects did not have the desired effect of bringing about their reform, then exposing the presence of these shameful transgressors could at least be used to draw a tighter, more defined border around the rightful members of that community. It served to clarify group values and group belonging. It had the potential to induce greater group solidarity.

As much as scholars agree on a general definition of shame and its workings, shame is not ahistorical. Reasons for feeling shame and manifestations of it vary from time to time and place to place. Shame has a history. Recent research into past accounts of shame has produced a growing collection of histories of the emotion.¹⁸ This body of work includes research into shame and crime; shame and family relations; shame, gender, and the body in political protest movements; and national consciousness and the 'stains' of the past, including indigenous dispossession in New Zealand and the Great Famine in Ireland.¹⁹ This is a growing body of scholarship. However, historians argue that much more research into past attitudes to shame is needed to understand how the meaning and manifestation of this emotion varied across time and space. More research is required to comprehend the multifaceted features of this uncomfortable, complex, and ever-changing emotion.²⁰

In this book, I expand historical understandings of the complexity and versatility of shame through examining its gendered and national and/or transnational dimensions. I analyse how three communities of patriotic women opposed to feminist campaigns for the vote articulated their understanding of the emotional styles—standards, regulations, and expressions—making up their specific gendered and emotional community. I undertake this task by focusing particularly on their attitudes towards shame and its related emotions. By adopting a transnational as well as national approach, I help to identify nationally specific understandings of shame as well as trace circulating discussions of shame as they cross a number of the national borders that comprise the British Empire. In doing so, this study contributes to a body of scholarship that Ida Blom has identified as transcultural histories of ‘the interactions between gender orders, nationalisms and nation building’.²¹ Blom asserts that multi-national investigations of this kind allow historians to more substantially understand the ‘cross-cultural parallels’ that sit alongside ‘decisive culturally determined differences’ in gendered constructions of the nation and nationalisms.²² This framework is also pertinent to the task of revealing how attitudes towards the place of gendered emotional regimes in nationalist processes variously connected and disconnected diverse communities of patriotic womanhood.

Being opposed to campaigns for the vote connected many of the groups of women studied here. However, each group’s reasons for opposing enfranchisement varied in line with national priorities. This had consequences for how each group constructed its emotional communities and for the nature of the deployment of emotional tools for political ends. For example, the Australian women I look at were reluctant suffragists. That is, they opposed their own enfranchisement. However, once the new Australian Commonwealth inducted them into formal citizenship, they took on the task of educating other reluctant patriotic women about how to vote in a manner that was beneficial to the integrity of Australian womanhood and the honour of the Australian nation. In many ways, the British women opposed to the vote harboured similar concerns to pre-enfranchised Australian women. The major difference was that British women were laden with the worries of the imperial centre, and Australian women had only the welfare of the relatively insignificant former colonies to care about. To bring shame on the colonies, then, meant something very different to dishonouring the centre of a vast imperial network. In Ireland, matters were different again. Many of the women who opposed the campaign for the vote did so because they put the needs of the aspiring Irish nation before those of the feminist community. They were not necessarily against feminist advancement. Rather, they wanted to prevent their nationalist sisters from asking British men for concessions that they should be asking Irish men for. To fail in this endeavour, they believed, was to compound the emasculated colonised Irish man’s shame.

Political women’s relationships with shame and related emotions were multi-dimensional. Patriotic women were highly attuned to the negative impact that rogue members could have on their community of womanhood. To bring shame on that community risked its

disintegration. As patriots, they were also painfully aware of the reputation of their nation. To shame the nation—to bring it into disrepute—could have catastrophic consequences for the national community. This was certainly the case for women in the imperial centre, where a reputation for stability and supremacy helped ensure ongoing control over a vast, disruptive empire. However, it was also true of patriotic women in smaller national units. Nationalist women in Ireland and Australia often assumed the role of guardian of the aspiring or fledgling nation's honour, whether they were invited to do so or not. Through examining patriotic women's approaches to shame and shaming, can we ascertain how far allegiance to the national community trumped that to the community of womanhood? What can an analysis of shame in women's politics reveal about competing national and gender anxieties and loyalties?

Before attempting to answer these questions, it is necessary to trace the intersecting national and gender anxieties in early twentieth-century England, Ireland, and Australia.

Britain's Intersecting Anxieties and 'Good' Patriotic Womanhood

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the British Empire was at its height, England—at the centre of that vast international network—articulated its understanding of itself largely within an international framework: as the standard bearers of civilisation, modernity, and progress globally.²³ Covering perhaps a quarter of the world's land mass and overseeing at least 400 million subjects scattered across 80 to 100 separate territorial units who acknowledged the sovereignty or accepted the protection of the British Crown, the British Empire was a formidable imperial power.

However, even at the height of empire, the imperial centre was beset by intersecting political anxieties which reflected the turbulent political conditions around the Empire at the time.²⁴ Well-publicised military defeats, such as those at the hands of the Afghanistans, Zulus, Boers, and Sudanese, promoted fears about national and imperial decline. At the same time, growing awareness of the fierce competition from countries such as Germany and Italy for global sites not yet occupied by Western imperial powers spurred a new sense of urgency in the imperial project.²⁵ Ironically, Britain's imperial success at this stage fed further worries 'at home'. As Britain continued to acquire vast new territories, anxieties about the corresponding increase in associated responsibilities and costs grew.²⁶ Doubt about the reasons for assuming this extra cost and responsibility surfaced. Questions abounded: Was it about continuing to bring civilisation to the less fortunate or maintaining the protection of trade routes or acquiring more territories and thereby greater profit and power? Whatever the specific nature of the uncertainty, this growing sense of imperial ambivalence contributed to what Bradley

Deane, in his study of masculinity and imperial identity, has termed the ‘ideological fog’ that permeated late Victorian society.²⁷

Perceived threats emanating both from outside and from within the Empire added to those uncertainties about the state of Britain’s imperial mission. In the decades preceding the end of the First World War, and certainly by the time of the Russian Revolution in 1917, the growing stature of socialism was to be a cause of grave concern to dedicated imperialists in the British centre and the colonial peripheries. Increasingly, as the twentieth century progressed, socialism was seen to be a major challenge to the supremacy of imperialism as the dominant international ideology. The threat that this ideology represented internally was no mere spectre. Within Britain, more working-class men were acquiring new political power thanks to the campaigns that led to the Parliamentary Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884, which expanded the British electorate from 1.3 million to 5.6 million.²⁸ Males from the working class were increasingly drawn into the metropole’s imperial concerns as their vote was courted.

As early twentieth-century British feminists began to agitate more visibly and more forcefully for the franchise to be extended to women, national, imperial, class, and gender anxieties intertwined. Such entangled anxieties were only heightened by the decision taken to adopt violent methods by a small but influential section of the British suffrage movement in 1905. British women had been campaigning for the vote since the 1860s.²⁹ Little progress was made, however, until many of the smaller influential suffrage societies across Britain gathered under the umbrella organisation, the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS), which was established in 1897 and was led for the most part by Millicent Garrett Fawcett. Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughter, Christabel Pankhurst, who were dissatisfied with the NUWSS’s lack of progress, formed the Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU) in 1903. The ‘confrontational, assertive and “unladylike” tactics’ of the new militant WSPU re-energised the suffrage campaign by forcing the feminist issue into the limelight.³⁰ From 1905 to 1912, the campaign took the form of heckling politicians and noisily disrupting political meetings, as well as a willingness to go to prison rather than paying fines for ‘unruly’ behaviour. From 1912 until their cessation with the beginning of the Great War in 1914, suffragettes,³¹ as members of the WSPU were labelled, moved on to more violent and often illegal forms of activity such as mass window-breaking raids; vandalising post boxes; attacking public property, including setting fire to buildings; and going on hunger strike.³² In 1918, a small section of British and Irish women were granted the right to vote for a Westminster parliament. British women had to campaign for another decade before they were granted the same voting rights as British men in 1928.

The unladylike tactics of the militant wing of the suffrage movement only exacerbated existing gender anxieties. By the turn of the century, many in England were intellectualising about how degenerate, decadent, and over-civilised the increasingly middle-class and bureaucratic imperial centre was. A significant aspect of this degeneracy was the blurring of

gender divisions. The existence of manly women—epitomised by the iconic feminist transgressor, the New Woman—and unmanly men—exemplified by the ‘bogey’ of the ‘hen-pecked, lower middle-class clerk’³³—called into doubt the naturalness of the gender divisions underpinning middle-class notions of respectability. Respectability dictated that men were the active doers—what Anne McClintock deems the ‘the forward-thrusting agency of national progress’.³⁴ Women were the inactive, metaphorical holders of the nation’s values: the conservative repository of the national archaic.³⁵ When transgressive feminists agitated for what seemed to be the right to ape or even supplant the British man’s role as embodiment of national progress—by challenging a national narrative that positioned women as ‘inherently atavistic’—they jeopardised the relevancy of the moral and social codes that underpinned and justified the so-called imperial civilising mission.³⁶ They threatened the stability of the Empire, for how could the metropole transport and transplant British notions of middle-class respectability—those on which the Empire depended—if its own women were unsettling these very values?

Not surprisingly, feminist agitation in the imperial centre provoked a very passionate, heated, even violent, exchange between those keen for reform and those protective of the status quo. Many British men were against women getting the vote. The reasons for some of this opposition are straightforward. Further expansion of the electorate would carry with it increasing complications. A greater diversity of voters and their interests would now have to be courted and catered to. The very real possibility also existed of men being forced to share power if women followed their demand for the vote with that of the right to stand for parliament.

However, what is perhaps surprising is the level of vitriolic opposition to the female franchise emanating from the community of ‘good’ patriotic British women.³⁷ If women were granted the right—and the duty—to vote, then everyday practices would change. Patriotic women would feel compelled to fulfil their political duties—educating themselves more closely in the political affairs of the nation and physically lining up at polling booths to submit their votes—thereby adding to the large volume of responsibilities that women already bore (chief among these was, of course, giving birth to and rearing the country’s future generations).

More significantly, though, many anti-suffragist women articulated their opposition to the granting of the franchise in terms of the corruption or complete dismantling of existing gendered emotional regimes. They were anxious not only about the possibility of a changed physical landscape—again, one which would now see women lining up at polling booths or even walking the corridors of parliament—but also about the very likely prospect of an altered emotional landscape. If women demanded a place in the public sphere, they would have to conform to masculine emotional standards. They would have to demonstrate that they could embody honour, for example. If they were to prove capable of doing this, what would happen

to those aspects of traditional honour codes that protected women from male acts of aggression? What would happen to chivalry? Such a drastically changed physical landscape would mean that the emotional rules or codes governing the behaviour of each sex would no longer be maintained. Emotional standards would no longer be relied on to govern relations between the sexes. Emotional chaos threatened.

Communities of ‘Good’ Patriotic Women: Ireland and Australia

Women in the imperial centre were, of course, not the only women around the Empire to feel that their gendered emotional communities were under threat from radical feminist demands. Many in Ireland too were campaigning for the female franchise. They had been doing so since the 1870s.³⁸ Not only were many in Ireland campaigning for the vote but by 1912, the Irish suffrage campaign had also entered into a militant phase. The difference with Ireland was its positioning on the imperial spectrum and the reactions of its population to this positioning.

Ireland was England’s oldest imperial possession and since the 1800 Act of Union it was either an equal partner in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland or, in the eyes of Irish nationalists certainly, an inferior member of the kingdom and a continued colonial possession. In the early decades of the twentieth century, there was a re-energised, organised push for national recognition in Ireland that was countered by strident Unionist opposition. However, as re-invigorated as the nationalist movement was, it was also a fractured one. On one side, there was the moderately nationalist Irish Parliamentary Party led by John Redmond who wanted a home-based parliament in Ireland—a Commonwealth parliament still subservient to the Westminster imperial parliament. On the other side of the nationalist debate there were the radicals who wanted complete separation from Britain—an independent Ireland free of all imperial ties, equal or subservient. These latter activists were represented in the main by Sinn Féin, whose aspirations for complete autonomy were clearly present in its title, translated from the Gaelic as ‘We, Ourselves’.

Not surprisingly, feminist activists in Ireland were as divided on the national question as Irish men. There were feminists who were loyal to the union with Britain and who played a pivotal role in Unionist politics of the time. However, by the early twentieth century, a large proportion of Irish feminists were nationalist in outlook: either those supporting the more popular moderate Home Rulers, or the minority of more extreme separatists supporting or being supported by Sinn Féin.³⁹

Women on both sides of the Irish Sea were connected by the fact that they were ruled by the same male British parliament over which they had no control. British and Irish feminists’ desires to empower women through enfranchising them made them part of the same network of suffrage activists. British and Irish feminists referenced each other’s campaigns; exchanged

funding, ideas, and approaches; and travelled across national spaces. British organisations on both sides of the suffrage debate established branches in Ireland, including the NUWSS, the WSPU, and the Anti-Suffrage League (later the National League for Opposing Woman Suffrage (NLOWS)).⁴⁰ Those activists who shared a commitment to using militant tactics were also arrested and imprisoned across both national spaces.⁴¹ However, these various ties with the British movement complicated suffrage politics in Ireland even further. For example, whereas some, mainly Unionist, women welcomed British organisations on Irish soil, others, nationalist in outlook, increasingly considered the presence of dominating, imperialist organisations in anti-colonial Ireland to be highly problematic.⁴² Divisions between the two national feminist communities were to grow more pronounced as the Irish nationalist campaign picked up pace and as British resentment of demands for separatism became more manifest.

The existence of links, however tenuous or fluid, between the Irish and the British suffrage movements—including the combined pressure exerted by Irish and British suffragists on Irish nationalist politicians—complicated Irish nationalist politics more generally.⁴³ While the moderate Irish Parliamentary Party, which held the balance of power in the Westminster parliament, was trying to push through a Home Rule Bill to secure a home-based parliament in Ireland, Irish feminists were campaigning for a clause for the female franchise to be inserted into that bill. Nationalist politicians largely opposed such a move on the grounds that inserting such a clause might give British politicians opposed to Irish Home Rule further reason for delaying its inception. Many nationalist women also saw wisdom in delaying the introduction of female suffrage until Home Rule had been secured. Not only that but also a number of Irish nationalist women were vehemently opposed to Irish women campaigning for the vote in an English parliament—what these radical nationalists saw as an enemy parliament. And so, for the purposes of this study of shame and gendered emotional regimes, what is so interesting about the Irish context is that some of the most strident anti-suffragism in Ireland—seemingly paradoxically—emanates from these Irish nationalist feminist women. Despite their strong, almost oppositional ideological preferences, conservative British female imperialists and radical Irish nationalist women had at least their opposition to women getting the vote in British parliament in common. These communities of Irish and British women patriots were bound together by their resort to shame and shaming to protect their respective nationalist priorities.

Across the far reaches of the Empire, in Australia, patriotic women were fighting a different battle. The Australian colonies were some of the first to grant women the right to vote globally and, in the case of the newly federated Australian Commonwealth, one of the first to simultaneously grant women the right to vote and to stand for parliament (1902). Therefore, those women who did not want the burden of the vote had no choice but to exercise that responsibility. Patriotic women then took it upon themselves to educate fellow women in their

new duties as voting citizens. Knowing the eyes of the world—and certainly those of Britain, the Mother Country⁴⁴—were on them, their fight, as they saw it, was to prove themselves loyal citizens of the Commonwealth and the Empire.

Despite feminist scholars' attempts to dispel it, in some quarters, the myth still persists that Australian men gave their womenfolk the vote as a kind of 'gift'.⁴⁵ However, the pathway to female enfranchisement in the Australian colonies was not straightforward or uniform. In 1901, Australia transformed from a group of six British colonies to a federated Commonwealth of Australia. A new federal parliament that dealt with matters pertaining to the Commonwealth as a whole was established. But, in keeping with a federal structure, the former colonies, now states, kept their separate parliaments. Most campaigns for the vote in the colonies (later states) began in the 1880s, although the character of each campaign differed. None were militant, and most took the form of lobbying politicians, raising petitions, sending deputations to parliament, and arranging lectures, public meetings, and speaking tours (usually across vast distances). The intensity of opposition differed in each colony/state too. Therefore, whereas women in South Australia won the vote in 1894, Western Australia followed in 1899. In 1902 and 1903, respectively, women were granted the right to vote in New South Wales and Tasmania. Queensland granted suffrage in 1905. After an acrimonious campaign, Victorian women were only enfranchised in 1908. This meant that Victorian women had to endure the frustrating experience of already voting in two Commonwealth elections before they could do so in their own state.⁴⁶

Importantly, the vote in Australia was racialised. Aboriginal women and men were disenfranchised whether through informal means or formal legislation. For example, indigenous people in Queensland and Western Australia were not enfranchised in 1902.⁴⁷ They were not to be granted the right to vote until 1962. The Australian woman's vote, therefore, was a predominantly white vote. The majority of suffragists failed to prioritise the voting rights of non-white women in this white settler-colonial society. In failing to do this, they proved themselves complicit with reigning views about the racial superiority of the Anglo-Saxons and the inevitability of the demise of the indigenous race.⁴⁸ This complicity of white feminists in racial exclusion has rendered complicated and uncomfortable some discussions about the legacies of the early feminist movement. At the time, whiteness and the task of not only carrying on the so-called British race but also using the unadulterated air of the 'new' world to rejuvenate that 'race' was a charge that white women in Australasia took very seriously.⁴⁹

To a large degree, then, white women voters' priorities chimed with the political aspirations and values of the newly federated Commonwealth. These national priorities were bolstered by perceived threats—territorial and racial—both from within and outside of Australia's borders. For instance, Australia harboured sub-imperial ambitions in the Pacific region.⁵⁰ And

so, like Britain, it experienced the threat of imperial competition from Western powers, including France, Germany, and the United States, who had territorial designs on the region. Australia pressed Britain to protect its interests in the area but found that Britain itself was under pressure to maintain its imperial dominance in the scramble for territory seemingly unclaimed by the Western powers. In light of this increased pressure, the imperial centre expected its Dominions, including Australia, to become more self-sufficient.⁵¹ Given its loyalty to the Empire, Australia also worried about the spread of international socialism. Socialism represented a threat to Western forms of imperial control. Therefore, in the early decades of the twentieth century, Australia shared a number of political aspirations and anxieties with the Mother Country: it worried about its imperial aspirations and about the perceived threat international socialism represented to traditional models of imperialism, especially from 1917 onwards.

Australian concerns also diverged from those of Britain. In contrast to the imperial centre whose race 'problems' were largely confined to the colonial outposts of the Empire, Australia was home to ever-intensifying racial anxieties.⁵² Racial tensions had always been present in Australia given the nature of British colonisation in the region and the frontier violence between the incoming white settlers and the indigenous inhabitants. However, at this time, the new white Commonwealth was more concerned with Asia than it was with its depleting indigenous population. It looked warily towards Japan as Japanese expansionary intentions with regard to places such as China, Korea, and Russia were imagined as a threat to Australia's borders. This perceived external danger was bolstered by the apparent threat from within represented primarily by the presence of cheap Chinese labour in the Australian colonies.

The move for Federation, then, was accompanied by that for a supposedly racially pure Australia—a White Australia.⁵³ Australia's racial policies were given formal recognition in the new Commonwealth parliament's 1901 Immigration Restriction Act, which allowed for selective immigration based on language tests. Other laws followed that discriminated against the non-white population already living in Australia by denying them rights to citizenship, welfare benefits, certain occupations, and, in some instances, land.⁵⁴ Australian politics and culture may have shared racial ideologies with the imperial centre, but its affairs were directed by policies of racism that were significantly different from any enacted in the British metropole. The unique nature of Australian women's racial anxieties were clearly evident in their political writings after enfranchisement.

On the issue of feminist militancy, Australian society avoided such violent disruptions, but some Australian women still managed to have a hand in them in Britain. For example, a number of prominent Australian suffragists—many of whom were born in the United Kingdom—travelled to Britain and either supported or directly participated in the militant movement there. Among these were Dora Montefiore, Nellie Martel, Jessie Street, and the more spectacular Muriel Matters (who is renowned for an infamous escapade during which

she threw out suffrage pamphlets from an airship over London not long after she had been released from prison for chaining herself to the Ladies' Gallery grille in the House of Commons). Perth-based Bessie Rischbieth, who became very conservative in later life, was also swept up by the energy of the militant movement when she visited London in 1913. Victoria's Vida Goldstein toured Britain and championed the movement there in 1911.⁵⁵

As mentioned earlier, the issue of the woman vote affected relations between the Irish and the British. So too did it affect colonial-imperial relations between Australia and Britain. Although now a Commonwealth parliament, the Australian parliament was still in a subordinate position to the Westminster parliament. Yet Australian women had managed to trump their sisters in the Mother Country by obtaining the right to vote decades before them. These factors combined to alter the nature of the relationship between feminists in the metropole and those in the peripheries. As Australian historian of British and Australian feminism Barbara Caine elucidates, the international woman suffrage movement allowed antipodean women their first opportunity 'to turn the imperial tables as it were, and to offer their unfortunate British sisters help, guidance and advice'.⁵⁶ The Australian example certainly worked to challenge metropolitan assumptions about the superior positioning of women in the imperial centre compared with those in the Empire's outposts. This turning of the tables can be seen in London's Great Suffrage Procession of June 1911. Many of the Australian women participating in the suffrage movement in Britain took part in the procession and in doing so they instructed their imperial mother to 'Trust the women Mother as I have done' via a banner carried by Margaret Fisher and Vida Goldstein. The very words of this banner reveal a collective belief in the advanced state of Australia's approach to relations between the sexes on the matter of citizenship. This was a sense of superiority that extended to other facets of society. For instance, activists such as Goldstein and Rischbieth certainly believed that the influence of the woman's vote on issues such as prostitution and employment in Australia was far in advance of conditions prevailing in the metropolitan centre.⁵⁷

The pressure that newly enfranchised female patriots in Australia placed on themselves to exercise the vote in a manner befitting rational, loyal women of the Empire, while cognisant that they were in many ways in a position of superiority in comparison to the women of the imperial centre, is evident in their political discourse. As in Britain and Ireland, awareness of national anxieties intersected with those about gender to produce a passionate body of political writing that acknowledged the important role that emotions played in the attempt to protect and police gendered emotional communities.

Imperial ties connected women across Britain, Ireland, and Australia, whether those women wanted them to or not. Whether loyal or disloyal, each group of national womanhood operated within the same imperial framework. They were affected by similar, if not the same, legislations. They had to frame their aspirations by referencing existing assumptions, for instance, about their country's position on the hierarchical imperial spectrum or about the

nature of British or non-British values. Knowledges were shared as ideas and values circulated around the Empire. Therefore, despite the many different circumstances shaping their individual national existences, these separate but linked communities of patriotic womanhood were often compelled to refer to each other when asserting their particular political aspirations. In this book, I look at both the national and the transnational dimensions of patriotic women's interactions with political emotions and national and international anxieties. I use their political writings to trace how these women understood the unique and the shared elements of their political and emotional experiences.

Women's Political Writing: The Sources

In the nineteenth century, the issue of women's rights received abundant attention in the pages of the British periodical press.⁵⁸ However, by the beginning of the twentieth century, as the campaign for suffrage intensified and grew increasingly contentious, the overwhelmingly male press either omitted reporting about the women's movement or did so in a highly skewed manner. Therefore, some feminist organisations decided to establish their own suffrage presses. Historian of feminist media Maria DiCenzo asserts that print media was the most effective way of circulating ideas at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was, therefore, the most suitable vehicle for attempting to influence public opinion.⁵⁹

Feminist publications were established to accommodate discussions taking place around the issue of women's rights, but they were also intended to mobilise readers—predominantly female readers—for political activism.⁶⁰ In the case of the suffrage movement, suffrage periodicals and pamphlets were aimed at harnessing the energies of confirmed or aspiring suffrage activists. Suffrage publications were, then, a crucial part of the suffrage movement's strategy.⁶¹ They were also to become an integral aspect of the anti-suffrage campaign, too, as anti-suffragist women, who felt they had a lot to lose if the vote was foisted on them, were moved to establish their own dedicated publication outlets. Women on both sides of the suffrage divide used the women's press to foster a firmer sense of an appropriate gendered political community.

These papers were dedicated to the issue of women's suffrage, but they produced articles that were also much broader in scope. As DiCenzo iterates, granting women citizenship on an equal basis with men was seen by many in turn-of-the-century society to have the potential to dramatically alter national life: law, marriage, family, educational institutions, and professions, as well as the political affairs of the state.⁶² Discussions taking place within women's political publications reflected the breadth of the women's rights debate.

These papers also worked to accommodate diverging points of view. In the United Kingdom, the feminist community, for example, was not homogenous. Rather, it was varied,

even fractured. The feminist press mirrored the multifaceted nature of the movement. In some instances, this was more prominent than in others. For example, the highly fractured nature of the Irish feminist movement was reflected in the pages of its press as feminist nationalists and nationalist feminists jostled for position.⁶³

These women's papers also referenced and responded to the views of their political opponents. For instance, the WSPU's official organ, *Votes for Women*, strategically kept abreast of developments taking place in anti-suffragist politics. The paper frequently referred to comments made by prominent anti-feminists or referenced articles published in their opponents' press, such as the NLOWS organ, the *Anti-Suffrage Review* (the *Review*). The *Review* did likewise.⁶⁴ These publications offer historians access to sites of struggle both within and between feminist organisations.⁶⁵ Looking across a selection of suffragist and anti-suffragist media also allows historians to gain insight into the debates taking place at the feminist/anti-feminist crossroads.

In its first edition in 1908, the British paper, the *Review*, declared that the body it represented—the Women's National Anti-Suffrage League, which was to amalgamate with the men's anti-suffrage league two years later to become the National League for Opposing Woman Suffrage—was driven to organise itself in response to the undignified actions of campaigning suffragists, particularly those adopting aggressive or violent tactics.⁶⁶ The *Review* explained that it had two overarching aims: one was to inspire and gather wide public support for opposition to woman suffrage through extra-parliamentary propaganda; the other was to 'exert direct pressure on parliamentary decision-makers'.⁶⁷ In the period preceding the war at least, male members of the League—including Lord Curzon and Lord Cromer—preferred pursuing a single-minded campaign to persuade male politicians of the dangers of female suffrage, while leading female members—such as Lady Jersey and the renowned novelist, Mary Ward—favoured using public appearances, speeches, and articles in the popular press and in the *Review* to garner mass public support for their cause and hopefully stimulate debate about the wider 'Woman Question'.⁶⁸ The paper had a wide readership drawn from members of the League. The League boasted 42,000 subscribing members and 15,000 adherents by 1914. Members were drawn from branches in England, Wales, and Ireland, and the affiliated Scottish League for Opposing Woman Suffrage.⁶⁹

In contrast to Irish feminist papers, which I discuss next, the pages of the *Review* contained political commentaries that were substantially uniform. That is to say, few contributors to the paper expressed views that were at odds with the majority opinion. They were united in their condemnation of feminist actions and feminist demands, and shared many reasons for doing so. This is not to argue that the views they articulated were in any way superficial or simplistic. Nor is it to claim that anti-suffragists were lacking in individuality. Brian Harrison, an early historian of the anti-suffrage campaign, warned against taking such a position. All too

often, he argued in 1978, the efforts of the anti-suffrage movement have been presented as 'misguided and unimportant', or their ideals have been dismissed on the basis of their eventual failure, thereby consigning this unsuccessful movement to 'history's rubbish-heap'. This conservative mindset, he asserted, was not singular, shallow, or uncomplicated.⁷⁰ Since then, Julia Bush has added her cautions. In 2007, Bush argued that modern histories of suffragism 'all too often ignore its committed female critics, and fail to evaluate the widespread support for their views'. Thus, she said, 'The women anti-suffragists have become eclipsed within an opposition which was itself marginalized by historical failure'.⁷¹

A much larger body of research exists on the triumphant flank of the British suffrage campaign than on the losing side, although interest in anti-suffrage politics and anti-feminism more generally has grown. From the 1990s onwards, more historians and literary scholars—including Lucy Delap, Valerie Sanders, Julia Bush, Tamara Wagner, and David Thackeray—have broadened current understandings of the sheer diversity of late Victorian and Edwardian conceptions of female citizenship from the point of view of women writers and activists. In doing so, they have challenged simple applications of the label 'anti-feminist' to women involved in anti-suffrage and other related campaigns.⁷² In this book, I sometimes adopt the term anti-feminist, but I do not do so uncritically. Women anti-suffragists were situated on the anti-feminist side of gender politics, but their reasons for adopting such a stance were deep, complex, and multilayered.

As I aim to show, women had many reasons for opposing the female franchise, and much of the time this came down to protecting a much-cherished set of gendered emotional standards and a gendered emotional community. Therefore, whereas I contribute to the still relatively small body of scholarship focusing on the women of the anti-suffragist movement, I do so in a manner that departs from existing histories. These histories explain the reasons women had for opposing female enfranchisement. They also highlight some of the strategies employed by these women. However, they do not examine in detail the emotional techniques deployed by anti-suffragist women in the attempt to reform or ostracise the aberrant feminist. Nor do they analyse anti-suffragist objections through the lens of gendered emotional communities and regimes, the concern for which, I argue, lay at the heart of many of their arguments.

The Irish feminist movement exemplifies the difficulties of attaching the 'anti-feminist' label to women opposed to the campaign for the vote much more obviously than even the British anti-suffrage campaign. As outlined previously, the Irish feminist movement was highly fractured. Not only that but also some of the most strident opposition to Irish women gaining the vote in British parliament came from other Irish feminist groups rather than simply emanating from self-professed, anti-feminist organisations. Therefore, to access the views of women opposed to the campaign for the vote there, I have had to consult feminist rather than anti-feminist periodicals.⁷³ As the preeminent organisation opposed to the British parliament granting women the right to vote, the NLOWS had claimed the right to establish

branches in Ireland, which, like the rest of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, was ruled directly by the Westminster parliament. The views expressed by the Irish members of this organisation mirror those of fellow members across the Irish Sea. The League's paper, the *Review*, accommodated the opinions of all members, British and Irish. Therefore, in order to access a specifically Irish response to the campaign for the vote in British parliament, I have looked to nationalist women's papers produced there. My interest is in patriotic women. I interpret 'patriotic' in the early twentieth-century Irish sense, as demonstrated by the intensifying majority anti-colonial nationalist campaign, to be Irish nationalist rather than British Unionist.

The volatile nature of politics in early twentieth-century Ireland, including the wars it engendered, produced a fractured feminist movement and, consequently, a fractured feminist archive. Therefore, I have chosen to examine a number of publications with short publication runs. In particular, I have selected *Bean na hEireann* (the *Bean*), translating as *Woman of Ireland*, which ran from 1908 to 1911 and which pronounced itself the first Irish nationalist feminist paper, and the *Irish Citizen* (the *Citizen*), a suffrage journal that emerged in 1912 in response to widening divisions among British and Irish suffragists and lasted until 1920 when its presses were destroyed by British forces in the Anglo-Irish War (Irish War of Independence).

The *Bean* was the organ of Inghinidhe na hEireann (Daughters of Ireland), a radical nationalist, pro-militant women's group that was to later merge with Cumman na mBan, the women's wing of the Irish Republican Army. The *Bean* labelled itself 'the first and only Nationalist Woman's paper'.⁷⁴ It promoted itself as a paper advocating separatism, feminism, and 'the interest of Irishwomen generally'. As Karen Steele explains, it 'quickly developed into an important platform for advanced nationalist women seeking a voice in the growing liberation movements of nationalism, feminism and socialism'.⁷⁵ Written mostly by women assuming strong Celtic personae, the paper also found room for commentary by male nationalists including Arthur Griffith, James Stephens, and Bulmer Hobson.⁷⁶ For the most part, the *Bean* was opposed to Irish women asking British men for political concessions. It was, therefore, anti-suffragist, though by no means anti-feminist.

The *Citizen* was the paper of the Irish Women's Franchise League (IWFL), the 'most active and most militant of all the suffrage groups in Ireland'.⁷⁷ It was certainly feminist in outlook and grew increasingly nationalist, although it initially stated that it was open to all suffragists, nationalist and Unionist.⁷⁸ Like the British WSPU, the IWFL was born out of frustration and discontent with the ineffectiveness of the older non-militant suffrage movement. This suffrage association was not typical of other organisations in Ireland. Not only was it militant but also largely intellectual in nature in that a number of the organisers held university degrees.⁷⁹ The *Citizen*, established in 1912 by Margaret and James Cousins and Hanna and Francis Sheehy Skeffington, avowed that it was a paper whose intentions were to represent Irish suffragism,

as distinct from the campaign in England. Within months of its establishment, the paper reported that it was selling perhaps 3,000 copies per week with a readership of over 10,000.⁸⁰ It functioned as a paper that would give a distinctly Irish voice to the suffrage campaign, thereby distinguishing it further from the British movement. However, by giving that campaign a distinctively Irish voice, it also operated as a retort to those anti-suffrage nationalists who had argued all along that the suffrage movement was an English and therefore a foreign and an un-Irish movement.⁸¹

Although a feminist paper, the *Citizen* suits the purposes of this book, which is to access how communities of patriotic womanhood understood the interconnections between gender and national politics and emotions. In its pages, the paper accommodated divergent views—those from across the divided Irish feminist community—even if the editors allowed their voices to have the final say. Therefore, it is useful for capturing a range of women’s voices on issues of importance to patriotic women and to the Irish nation.

The Australian Women’s National League (AWNL) was established in 1904 in the state of Victoria. The League listed as its four objectives to support loyalty to the throne and empire, to combat socialism, to educate women in politics, and to safeguard the interests of the home, women, and children.⁸² At this stage, Victoria was the only state not to have given women the vote, even though these women were already voting in federal elections. The AWNL was initially opposed to the woman vote. However, by 1906, it pledged support for enfranchisement.⁸³ It was an expansive and influential body of patriotic women. During the First World War, AWNL membership grew to 54,000, across 420 branches, making it the largest body of organised women in Australia and perhaps even ‘the largest explicitly women’s political organisation in the world’ at that time.⁸⁴ In 1907, on the eve of Victorian women being enfranchised, the League established its paper, the *Woman* (*Woman*).

The paper dedicated itself to educating the women of the country who now had the right to vote in federal parliament in their new duties as enfranchised citizens of the new Commonwealth, whether they welcomed those duties or not.⁸⁵ In the first issue of *Woman*, the editors stated that it was ‘an Australian magazine, owned, managed, and edited by women’ and designed ‘to enlist the influence and the sympathies of women throughout the Commonwealth’.⁸⁶ The overarching aims of the paper were ‘to encourage the work of Australian women, to promote unity of thought on subjects of national moment, and to form a factor in interesting and amusing women in wholesome and common-sense directions’ and all from ‘an anti-socialistic standpoint’.⁸⁷ The large majority of women may well have opposed the granting of the female franchise—they may well have had it ‘thrust upon them’—but now that they had it, patriotic women had to be willing to accept the duty as a serious responsibility.⁸⁸

Woman expressed the necessity for unity. The disparate Australian states had to have a

unity of purpose. Therein lay the best means of protecting Australia's welfare. The paper promoted a similar unity of purpose among the new female electorate. The AWNL was a state-based organisation in Victoria. Nevertheless, it issued the call to all Australian women to act as a unified whole in order to fortify the new nation. The interests and needs of individual states were still important, the paper instructed, but 'there should be union on those matters of joint importance which affect us as citizens, not merely of a State, but of a Commonwealth'.⁸⁹ In the pages of *Woman*, patriotic Australian women articulated their understandings of intersecting national, imperial, and gender anxieties. They used the paper as a vehicle for their attempted construction of a patriotic and unified community of dedicated newly enfranchised political women.

The sets of political publications analysed in this book were produced in different national sites and accordingly responded to different national priorities. However, they were also linked by a number of factors. As previously mentioned, the three communities of patriotic womanhood were linked by their ties to the British Empire. The women leading these political organisations and writing for their particular papers were educated and sometimes privileged or renowned members of their societies. It can be assumed that they were largely Christian in outlook—certainly, a Christian ethos pervades much of their discourse—although they rarely specified denomination in their writing. Given that their shared remit was to produce or protect a community of patriotic or nationalist womanhood from the feminist threat, it makes sense that they did not exclude potential members on the basis of religious denomination.⁹⁰ Each group of patriotic womanhood had the best interests of their respective nations at heart amid transforming imperial conditions and connections. Moreover, although men contributed to the periodicals in question, these journals were dedicated to discussing women's issues, specifically the woman vote. The papers were endorsed by women's political organisations. Therefore, I tend not to discern between female and male writers (even where the sex of the writer is known, which is frequently not the case). Instead, I take the collection of articles produced by each organisation as one body of writing representing the interests of discreet groups of national womanhood. In the rare instances when I do single out the sex of the author, I do so because I think a distinctly male contribution adds to my understanding of gendered emotional regimes.

Locating Emotions in Women's Political Writing

In this study, I argue that early twentieth-century women who participated in the political lives of their nations—willingly or only reluctantly—articulated and used emotions in a way that is revealing of just how cognisant they were, not only of the place of emotions in political life but also of the need for a strategic deployment of emotions for political ends. More than

this, these women also acknowledged the specifically gendered nature of these emotions and their deployment of them. This self-awareness helps historians to locate the emotions in their texts.

I adopt a number of approaches to locating and analysing the emotions in women's past political writings. These include identifying emotional vocabularies and ascertaining active emotional processes. In the first place, I analyse the vocabulary of emotions as it relates to shame and related emotions, including honour, courage, chivalry, embarrassment, and indignation. Often anti-suffragist women wrote using direct or clear emotional expressions. Marie Corelli, for example, made direct reference to disgust, shame, indignation, and humiliation. Often anti-suffragist women writing for the *Review* used similar variants of shame to express their opposition to feminist demands. Sometimes they referred to affective responses to feminist behaviour too. For example, some writers professed to blush or burn with shame. I detail these as I come across them.

Secondly, I seek out descriptions of active emotional processes—of emotions in action. This is about unearthing more embedded understandings of emotions. It involves reading into the text for the purpose of understanding how women used emotions to further their political intentions. Such a process requires commencing with a definition of a particular emotion and then forming an understanding of how that emotion performs. The issue of definition is important here. Historians disagree on the matter of how rigid our definitions of individual emotions have to be before beginning the search for them in historical documents. German historian Ute Frevert has called for rigidly defined emotions. Fellow scholar of German history Alon Confino has countered that 'a tight definition of "emotions"' can actually be counter-productive. 'With such a definition', he asserts, 'we cannot capture the looseness and fluidity of emotions, which is precisely what characterized them'. A broad definition of emotions is enough, he argues, to start the historian on her or his research. 'Ultimately', Confino states, 'what is important is how people in the past defined emotions; the historian's best move is to start with their understandings.'⁹¹ Once a partial definition is achieved, my aim is to understand how the emotion worked.

Shame—that fear of being judged deficient—for example, was about threatening to remove a potential transgressor from a community to which she or he attached value. Therefore, shame was present in a text where anti-suffragist women pointed out feminists' lack of worthiness as women—where they attempted to remove them from the community of 'good' womanhood that they had defined. I discuss this further in [Chapter 1](#). Embarrassment is another case in point. As I discuss in [Chapter 3](#), embarrassment is brought about when someone transgresses an accepted rule—when they should have known better. When British anti-suffragists expressed surprise, even dismay, at antipodean women daring to place themselves on an equal footing with their metropolitan sisters, they revealed that they felt vicarious embarrassment for Australian women who should have known better than to

compare themselves with their superiors. Having the franchise in the insignificant colonies, for instance, was not comparable with having voting power in the centre of a vast imperial network. Shame or embarrassment might not have been cited directly in these instances, but they were both at work in the text.

My intention is not to judge how effective these emotional processes were. I keep Jill Locke's caution about the limitations of shaming in mind. Rather, I am keen to gauge just how effective early twentieth-century political women considered shame and shaming to be, given the abundance of it in their writings. I am also concerned with accessing what these women understood of the emotional milieu in which they—and their shaming strategies—operated.

Defining particular emotions and understanding how they operated in the early twentieth century is a complex task. I deal with the complications of this task in two ways. Firstly, I often quote lengthy passages from women's political writing to enable the reader to access how women at the time understood particular emotions and to discern how the emotions worked within the text. Secondly, I deal with definitions of distinct emotions related to shame and explanations of how they function in the relevant individual chapter. For example, whereas I explain in detail the workings of shame in [Chapter 1](#) 'Shaming Unwomanly Women' and embarrassment in [Chapter 3](#) 'Embarrassing the Imperial Centre', I delve into understandings of specific virtues such as honour and chivalry and courage in the chapters relevant to those virtues. I elaborate on nationalised concepts of honour in [Chapter 2](#) 'Reversing the Shame of British Colonisation' and [Chapter 4](#) 'Shaming British-Australia'. In [Chapter 5](#) 'War and the Dishonourable British Feminist', I examine how masculinised honour codes fared in wartime. I analyse moral and physical courage in [Chapter 6](#) 'Shaming Manhood to Embody Courage' and chivalry in [Chapter 7](#) 'The Shame of the Violent Woman'. The ever-present and ever-versatile emotion of shame—connected as it is to all of the aforementioned emotional virtues—threads through and links every chapter.

The Structure of the Book

One immediate concern for anti-suffrage women when contemplating the possibility of female enfranchisement was the impact it would have on accepted concepts of womanhood and notions of femininity. They worried that taking so much time away from the family and the home to participate in a public campaign—marching in the streets and participating in public meetings and political deputations—would adversely affect the well-being of the family. It would, therefore, paint a negative picture of womanhood as a community of individuals who were selfish enough to abandon the sex's primary duty as carer for and guardian of the family. Womanhood, anti-suffragist women argued, was not made for the cold, harsh, and competitive world of politics. The emotional regimes guiding men's and women's experiences were not the same. Women were not emotionally prepared to participate in the masculinised

public realm. This was not in keeping with feminine norms. For feminists to attempt to force their sisters to take on this foreign and anxiety-inducing obligation was cruel and unwomanly. That too was not in keeping with feminine norms. In [Chapter 1](#), I examine how British anti-suffragist women understood the shame of the feminist transgressor. I analyse how and why they attempted to shame their suffragist sisters into abandoning their political crusade. How did they understand shame as a politicised emotion and shaming as a gendered political tool? Did Irish feminists opposed to the Irish suffrage campaign adopt similar tactics for similar reasons? How did enfranchised women in Australia—those who had not wanted the vote—respond to the portrait of the shamelessly unfeminine political woman?

Patriotic women across the British Empire were keenly attuned to discussions about national honour and its antithesis, shame. However, their concerns about this issue assumed different forms, reflecting different national priorities. Whereas Irish women situated across the intersecting branches of nationalist politics lamented the emasculation of the once proud Irish nation, Australian women were anxious that their young virile Commonwealth would prove itself a worthy member of the Empire's family of nations. At the centre of that vast imperial network, British women worried that any slur cast on their national reputation would mean the fall of a noble and enriching empire. In [Chapter 2](#), I examine how patriotic Irish women approached the issue of the gendered nature of national honour. These women were painfully attuned to the shame of the colonised nation and colonised manhood. They were also aware that modern society directed that only men were equipped to restore the nation's honour. These gender restrictions and the perceived abject state of their menfolk frustrated enthusiastic female patriots. How did these nationalist women respond to the existence of physical impediments and emotional regulations that prevented them from actively restoring their country's pride? How did they challenge the gendered nature of prevailing honour codes?

In [Chapter 3](#), I look specifically at the relationship between Britain and Australia from the point of view of the two communities of patriotic womanhood. Australian women had already been granted the right to vote. Loyal British-Australian women desired that women in the imperial centre would be likewise enfranchised. That way, they could all form part of a transnational community of enfranchised loyal empire womanhood. Anti-suffragists in Britain considered that experiments in the insignificant colonial outposts had no bearing on affairs at the heart of the vast and troublesome imperial network. How, then, did those British anti-suffragists respond to antipodean women's attempts to advise the Mother Country about how to treat its womanhood? How did Australian women respond to claims emanating from the imperial centre that they were guilty of transgressing emotional rules guiding relations between the metropole and the former colonies? What do these exchanges reveal about the nature of embarrassment, vicarious or otherwise?

Loyal British-Australians may have deflected metropolitan assertions of embarrassment,

even shame, over their promotion of enfranchised models of womanhood, but they were not free from the effects of core-periphery anxieties of a more general nature. Of all the Empire's women, patriotic Australian women considered themselves to be uniquely burdened with the responsibility of guarding against national shame. Many of them had not wanted the vote. But now, as voting citizens, they had a direct hand in choosing how the honour of the young white nation was protected. Their anxieties, therefore, were twofold. On the one hand, they worried that the new nation would not prove itself a mature and loyal member of the imperial family of nations and would instead bring shame upon itself and the Empire. On the other hand, patriotic women expressed a deep concern that women citizens would not perform this new role with the level of political wisdom and patriotic zeal required of them. In [Chapter 4](#), I examine how patriotic Australian women used shame in their attempts to protect the integrity of their identity as loyal British-Australians.

In [Chapter 5](#), I extend the discussions of national honour found in previous chapters. While patriotic women in the Australian outposts worried that they were not proving themselves worthy of the beneficence of the Motherland, women in that Motherland were to be found besmirching the name of that great imperial centre with impunity. The disruptive public actions of pre-war militant and non-militant British suffragists had brought shame to the nation. Their deviant behaviour only intensified with the onset of the Great War. Before the war, anti-suffragists opposed women's entry into the public sphere on the grounds that these women were not trained to adhere to the masculine honour codes that directed men's participation in that realm. Inexperienced women would only affect a corruption of those gendered codes with their unwarranted and unwanted intrusions. Now, with the outbreak of war, these same deviant women were demanding expanded access to public roles. They were partially successful in securing this access. For anti-suffragists witnessing the debacle, the only outcomes secured by this dubious success seemed to be the appearance of duplicitous women politicians who could not honour wartime truces and vampirish battlefield nurses who preyed on sick and wounded soldiers for political favours. In this chapter, I analyse the use of shame to oppose the dishonourable wartime feminist and her efforts to degrade the moral and emotional fabric of wartime British society.

In the final two chapters of the book, I address the gendered and emotional dimensions of violence. Courage and chivalry were integral aspects of masculine honour codes. Violence underpinned these codes. Men could resort to male-on-male violence publicly to restore any lost honour. Women could not claim any active relationship with honour. They could not act in its name. Therefore, they could not enact violence publicly. They existed beyond the masculine realms of honour and violence. This was to be particularly pertinent when it came to World War One. Men were required to perform violence and abide by honour codes in the name of the State. Women were not. In [Chapter 6](#), I analyse women's attitudes towards the gendered emotional virtue of courage. How did patriotic women who respected the boundaries dividing

men's and women's emotional regimes react to men's displays of cowardice? Did they justify transgressing those boundaries in order to shame their menfolk into enlisting for the war? How did they use shame to motivate men to overcome cowardice at this crucial time in the histories of their respective nations? Did they challenge the gendered nature of courage, even during wartime?

In [Chapter 7](#), I focus on women's violence, or their threats to embody violence, whether for feminist or nationalist reasons. The emotional virtue I draw on most in this chapter is chivalry. Chivalric codes emphasised manly attributes such as courage under fire, well-honed military skills, generosity in victory, and honour in victory or defeat. In an early twentieth-century context, such codes also placed an emphasis on exercising courtesy towards women. Many anti-suffragist women interpreted this courtesy in terms of protection from male acts of aggression. Adherence to notions of chivalry meant men, the physically stronger sex, promising women, the physically weaker sex, protection from violence (a promise of protection that was often more ethereal than real given the prevalence of domestic violence). What happened to those codes and promises when it was women perpetrating acts of violence—whether disruptive and unruly suffragettes or overly patriotic women agitating to fight alongside men on the frontlines of war? How did those women opposed to modern feminism's insistence on sexual equality—even physical equality—react to this seemingly supremely dangerous dismantling of gendered emotional regimes? What impact did national priorities and national narratives have on acceptances of or challenges to female acts of militancy? Did any of these patriotic women construct what might be called a feminist ethics of violence? How was violence used to attack the gendered nature of emotional regimes?

Notes

- 1 Marie Corelli, *Woman, or—Suffragette? A Question of National Choice* (London: Arthur Pearson, 1907) pp. 3–4.
- 2 Brian Masters, *Now Barabbas Was a Rotter: The Extraordinary Life of Marie Corelli* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978) p. 10. For other readings on Corelli, see Annette R. Federico, *Idol of Suburbia: Marie Corelli and Late-Victorian Literary Culture* (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 2000); William Stuart Scott, *Corelli: The Story of a Friendship* (London: Hutchinson, 1955); Eileen Bigland, *Corelli: The Woman and the Legend* (London: Jarrolds, 1953); George Bullock, *Corelli: The Life and Death of a Best-Seller* (London: Constable, 1940); and Teresa Ransom, *Miss Marie Corelli, Queen of Victorian Bestsellers* (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1999). Shorter readings include: Margaret B. McDowell, 'Marie Corelli', in Thomas F. Staley, ed., *Dictionary of Literary Biography, vol. 34: British Novelists, 1890–1929: Traditionalists* (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1985) pp. 82–89; John Lucas, 'Marie Corelli', in James Vinson, ed., *Great Writers of the English Language: Novelists and Prose Writers* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979) pp. 281–283; and Sandra Kemp, Charlotte Mitchell, and David Trotter, 'Corelli', in *Edwardian Fiction: An Oxford Companion* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) p. 77.

- 3 These quotations are taken from a selection of Corelli's fiction and non-fiction. For a more detailed discussion of Corelli's criticism of British feminists, see Sharon Crozier-De Rosa, 'Marie Corelli's British New Woman: A Threat to Empire?', *The History of the Family*, vol. 14, no. 4 (2009); and Sharon Crozier-De Rosa, 'Marie Corelli, Shame and the "New Woman" in Fin-de-Siècle Britain', in David Lemmings, Ann Brooks, eds., *Emotions and Social Change: Historical and Sociological Perspectives* (Oxford: Routledge, 2014).
- 4 It is widely accepted that the term 'New Woman' was first coined in 1894 by the novelist Sarah Grand, pseudonym of Frances Elizabeth Belleuden Clarke, author of *The Heavenly Twins*, 1893. Grand's article entitled 'The New Aspect of the Woman Question,' in which she uses the term 'New Woman,' was published in 1894, in the *North American Review* (David Rubinstein, *Before the Suffragettes: Women's Emancipation in the 1890s* (Brighton: Harvester, 1986) pp. 15–16). See also Barbara Caine, *Victorian Feminists* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) p. 252. For an extensive discussion of Grand and the New Woman novel, see Teresa Mangum, *Married, Middlebrow, and Militant: Sarah Grand and the New Woman Novel* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001). Exact definitions of the term, New Woman, vary. For discussions of definition, see Sally Mitchell, 'New Women, Old and New', *Victorian Literature and Culture*, vol. 27, no. 2 (1999) pp. 579–588. Also see Crozier-De Rosa, 'Marie Corelli's British New Woman', pp. 416–429.
- 5 Early twentieth-century commentators tended to capitalise the term, Suffragette. However, since then, the word has entered into common usage, therefore I do not capitalise unless within quotations.
- 6 Corelli, *Woman, or—Suffragette?*, p. 20.
- 7 Corelli, *Woman, or—Suffragette?*, p. 18.
- 8 Jill Locke, 'Shame and the Future of Feminism', *Hypatia*, vol. 22, no. 4 (2007) pp. 146–162.
- 9 Here I am applying an understanding of transnationalism as the movement of people, institutions, and ideas across and through national boundaries. See Akira Iriye, 'Transnational History', *Contemporary European History*, vol. 13, no. 2 (2004) pp. 211–222, p. 212; Ian Tyrrell, 'Comparative and Transnational History', *Australian Feminist Studies*, vol. 22, no. 52 (2007) pp. 49–54, p. 49, and Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake, 'Introduction', in Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake, eds., *Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective* (Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2005) pp. 6–20.
- 10 For a guide to the development of this area of historiography, see Susan Matt, 'Current Emotion Research in History: Or, Doing History from the Inside Out', *Emotions Review*, vol. 3, no. 1 (2011) pp. 117–124.
- 11 Barbara Rosenwein, 'Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions', *Passions in Context I: International Journal for the History and Theory of Emotions*, no. 1 (2010) pp. 1–32, p. 1. Also see Barbara Rosenwein, 'Worrying About Emotions in History', *The American Historical Review*, vol. 107, no. 3 (2002) pp. 921–945.
- 12 William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) p. 129.
- 13 See 'introduction' to a special edition of the journal *Rethinking History* on emotional styles, edited by Benno Gammerl, 'Emotional Styles—Concepts and Challenges', *Rethinking History*, vol. 16, no. 2 (2012) pp. 161–175, pp. 163–4.
- 14 Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, Francesca Polletta, 'Introduction: Why Emotions Matter', in Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, Francesca Polletta, *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001) pp. 1–24, pp. 1–2. Since then, numerous scholars have produced research findings on the role of emotions in political life, whether current or historical. For example, see the work of political scientist Carol Johnson, including her

article 'From Obama to Abbott: Gender Identity and the Politics of Emotion,' which provides a succinct appraisal of recent scholarship on emotions and politics. See Carol Johnson, 'From Obama to Abbott: Gender Identity and the Politics of Emotion,' *Australian Feminist Studies*, vol. 28, no. 75 (2013) pp. 14–29.

- 15 See Johnson, 'From Obama to Abbott', p. 15. A preoccupation with assigning passion and reason their rightful place in the political realm is not new. The increasingly visible incursion of women into the public affairs of the early twentieth-century state, for example, was responsible for sparking sometimes heated discussion about the place of emotions in politics. In January 1910, in 'The Women's Parliament' page of the moderately feminist Irish periodical, *The Lady of the House*, for example, one correspondent claimed that the actions of militant feminists had halted the progress of the mainstream suffrage movement because of 'people naturally feeling that hysteria has no place in political life': 'a more well-balanced mental attitude must be the portion of those who seek to help control the destinies of our country' (*The Lady of the House*, 15 January 1910, p. 15). More radical publications, such as the feminist periodical, *The Irish Citizen*—while acknowledging that conservative politicians had 'a great objection to emotion in politics'—did not mind admitting the emotional into the political; indeed, in one article in that publication, at least they strenuously declared that all life was emotional and so it was natural and right for both emotion and reason to be allowed to inform political life (*The Irish Citizen*, vol. 1, no. 1, 25 May 1912, p. 2).
- 16 Thomas J. Scheff, 'Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory,' *Sociological Theory*, vol. 18, no. 1 (2000) pp. 84–99, p. 97.
- 17 I discuss shame in much greater detail in Chapter 1. See Thomas J. Scheff, 'Shame in Self and Society,' *Symbolic Interaction*, vol. 26, no. 2 (2003) pp. 239–262, p. 256.
- 18 For a discussion of the challenges facing historians of shame, see Peter N. Stearns, 'Shame, and a Challenge for Emotions History,' *Emotion Review*, vol. 8, no. 3 (2015) pp. 197–206.
- 19 See, for example, David Nash and Anne-Marie Kilday, *Cultures of Shame: Exploring Crime and Morality in Britain 1600–1900* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Deborah Cohen, *Family Secrets: Shame and Privacy in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Begoña Aretxaga, *Shattering Silence: Women, Nationalism, and Political Subjectivity in Northern Ireland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Barbara Brookes, 'Shame and Its Histories in the Twentieth Century,' *Journal of New Zealand Studies*, no. 9 (2010) pp. 37–54; and Vincent Comerford, 'Grievance, Scourge or Shame? The Complexity of Attitudes to Ireland's Great Famine,' in Christian Noack, Lindsay Janssen and Vincent Comerford, eds., *Holodomor and Gorta Mór: Histories, Memories and Representations of Famine in Ukraine and Ireland* (London: Anthem Press, 2012).
- 20 See Nash and Kilday, *Cultures of Shame*, pp. 173–174. For a more detailed discussion of the need for further historicisation of shame, see Nash, 'Towards an Agenda for a Wider Study of Shame'.
- 21 Blom identifies this as an emerging area of scholarship but she also highlights, 'Much more comparative research is needed to reach a better understanding of the gendered meaning of duties to the nation.' See Blom, 'Gender and Nation in International Comparison', p. 5 and p. 17. For an example of Blom's contribution to the field, via her comparison of nation-building processes and the role of gender in Norway, Japan, India, and Sweden, see Ida Blom, 'Feminism and Nationalism in the Early Twentieth Century: A Cross-Cultural Perspective,' *Journal of Women's History*, vol. 7, no. 4 (1995) pp. 82–94.

- [22](#) Blom, 'Gender and Nation in International Comparison', p. 14.
- [23](#) This inextricable merging of the English nation and the British Empire means that Englishness and Britishness merged. Although they were not exactly synonymous terms, they were often used interchangeably. In this book, I tend to use English when referring only to the inhabitants of England. I use British more expansively, however, when I am referring to British values or a sense of a global British peoples or, more contentiously, 'race'. For more on the interconnections between the British metropole and its empire, see Bernard Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) pp. 243–244; Shula Marks, 'History, the Nation and Empire: Sniping from the Periphery', *History Workshop Journal*, vol. 29, no. 1 (1990) pp. 111–119, pp. 115–117; and Krishan Kumar, 'Nation and Empire: English and British National Identity in Comparative Perspective', *Theory and Society*, vol. 29, no. 5 (2000) pp. 575–608, pp. 575 and 591.
- [24](#) See Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists*, p. 252; Bradley Deane, 'Imperial Barbarians: Primitive Masculinity in Lost World Fiction', *Victorian Literature and Culture*, vol. 38, no. 1 (2008) pp. 205–225, p. 213, and see Andrew Thompson, *The Empire Strikes Back: The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005) for an extended discussion of what the empire meant to various sections in England including the elites, middle- and lower middle class, and the working class.
- [25](#) Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists*, pp. 165–167.
- [26](#) Deane, 'Imperial Barbarians', p. 213, and Iveta Jusová, *The New Woman and the Empire* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2005) p. 4.
- [27](#) See Deane, 'Imperial Barbarians', p. 213. Deane argues that the popularity of 'Lost World' novels, those novels that explored forgotten cities, empires, or civilisations and the ambiguous relationship between the modern adventurer and the 'primitive' man, between the 'barbarian' and the civilised, reveals the existence of 'a significant uncertainty about late Victorian imperialist ambitions and their relationship to "barbarism"' (Deane, 'Imperial Barbarians', p. 205).
- [28](#) Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists*, p. 167.
- [29](#) Susan Kingsley Kent asserts that the period from 1866—when the first mass petitions were collected and presented to parliament—to 1870 has been labelled the first phase of the organised movement and was characterised by 'optimism and spirited activity'. The second phase of the movement, stretching from the 1870s until 1905, was characterised by substantial feminist reform but little progress regarding the vote. See Susan Kingsley Kent, *Sex and Suffrage in Britain, 1860–1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) p. 184.
- [30](#) June Purvis, 'Fighting the Double Moral Standard in Edwardian Britain: Suffragette Militancy, Sexuality and the Nation in the Writings of the Early Twentieth-Century British Feminist Christabel Pankhurst', in Francisca de Haan, Margaret Allen, June Purvis and Krassimira Dasklova, eds., *Women's Activism: Global Perspectives from the 1890s to the Present* (New York: Routledge, 2013) pp. 121–135, p. 121.
- [31](#) Members of the militant Women's Freedom League (WFL) were also referred to as suffragettes in the anti-feminist press; however, the tactics of the WFL, although militant, were not violent. This is discussed further in Chapter 7.
- [32](#) Purvis, 'Fighting the Double Moral Standard in Edwardian Britain', p. 121.
- [33](#) Deane, 'Imperial Barbarians', p. 213.
- [34](#) Anne McClintock, 'No Longer in a Future Heaven: Gender, Race and Nationalism', in Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti

and Ella Shohat, eds., *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation and Postcolonial Perspectives* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) pp. 89–112.

[35](#) McClintock, 'No Longer in a Future Heaven', pp. 89–112.

[36](#) McClintock, 'No longer in a Future Heaven', p. 93.

[37](#) I write 'good' because many of the women on both sides of the suffrage debate couched their defences of their relative positions in terms that were very nationalistic. However, in discounting the patriotism of radical feminists, those on the anti-suffragist side tended to construct a community of female patriots who were 'good' rather than manipulative, false, or misguided.

[38](#) Activists such as the Dublin-based Quaker Anna Haslam and Belfast Presbyterian Isabella Tod had been campaigning for the vote in Ireland since the 1870s. Nationalist and Unionist women formed part of the same movement for women's emancipation, although until the twentieth century, Protestants and Unionist women formed the majority of active suffragists. See Mary Cullen, 'Feminism, Citizenship and Suffrage: A Long Dialogue', in Louise Ryan and Margaret Ward, eds., *Irish Women and the Vote: Becoming Citizens* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007) pp. 1–20, p. 12. For more on Irish emancipation campaigns generally, see Mary Cullen, 'The Potential of Gender History', in Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, ed., *Gender and Power in Irish History* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2009) pp. 18–38.

[39](#) For a detailed discussion on the differences of women's nationalism in Ireland, see Margaret Ward, *Unmanageable Revolutionaries: Women and Irish Nationalism* (London: Pluto Press, 1983); Margaret Ward, 'Conflicting Interests: The British and Irish Suffrage Movements', *Feminist Review*, vol. 50, no. 1 (1995) pp. 127–147; Louise Ryan, 'Traditions and Double Moral Standards: The Irish Suffragists' Critique of Nationalism', *Women's History Review*, vol. 14, no. 4 (1995) pp. 487–503; Cliona Murphy, 'Suffragists and Nationalism in Early Twentieth-Century Ireland', *History of European Ideas*, vol. 16, nos. 4–6 (1993) pp. 1009–1015; and Senia Pašeta, *Irish Nationalist Women, 1900–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[40](#) Cliona Murphy, *The Women's Suffrage Movement and Irish Society in the Early Twentieth Century* (New York; London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989) p. 75. For a history of the Irish suffrage movement, also see Rosemary Cullen Owen, *Smashing Times. A History of the Irish Women's Suffrage Movement, 1889–1922* (Dublin: Attic Press, 1984).

[41](#) The first group of Irish women to be imprisoned in Ireland for their militancy consisted of eight women: Hanna Sheehy Skeffington, Margaret Murphy, Jane Murphy, Marguerite Palmer, Marjorie Hasler, Kathleen Houston, Maud Lloyd, and Hilda Webb. They were arrested in Dublin in June 1912 for throwing stones through the windows of government offices. However, prior to this, in 1910 and then again in 1911, Irish women, including IWFL co-founder, Margaret Cousins, were imprisoned in England for participating in protests organised by the WSPU. See William Murphy, *Political Imprisonment and the Irish, 1912–1921* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) p. 14.

[42](#) Cliona Murphy points out an irony in the growing tensions between the British and the Irish suffrage movements by drawing attention to the fact that it was not only Unionist suffragists that benefited from the links to the British movement. The fiercely nationalistic suffragists, Hanna and Francis Sheehy Skeffington and Margaret and James Cousins established the nationalist suffrage paper, the *Irish Citizen*, with 200 pounds received from their English suffragist friends, Emmeline and Frederick Pethick Lawrence, who established the militant paper, *Votes for Women*. See Murphy, *The Women's Suffrage Movement and Irish Society in the Early Twentieth Century*, p. 76.

- [43](#) The degree to which Irish and British suffrage movements were linked is debated. Cliona Murphy, for example, argues that, despite the proximity of these campaigns, the Irish campaign's substantive connections to the British movement 'amounted to little more than its connections with the American or Australian movements'. See Murphy, *The Women's Suffrage Movement and Irish Society in the Early Twentieth Century*, p. 7.
- [44](#) The politically conservative Australian women whose works I examine in this book referred to England and Britain as the Mother Country. Therefore, I use that term throughout to exemplify their view of their relationship with the imperial centre.
- [45](#) For an excellent appraisal of the 'gift or struggle' debate, see Audrey Oldfield, *Woman Suffrage in Australia: A Gift or a Struggle?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Also, drawing on the works of Anne Summers, Beverley Kingston, Katie Spearitt and Audrey Oldfield, Susan Magarey stresses the point that the women's movement in Australia in later decades of the nineteenth century was a 'struggle', however optimistic the vision of a new identity for women and a new world in which to situate that identity. See Susan Magarey, 'History, Cultural Studies, and Another Look at First-Wave Feminism in Australia', *Australian Historical Studies*, vol. 27, no. 106 (1996) pp. 96–110, p. 101.
- [46](#) See Oldfield, *Woman Suffrage in Australia*, p. 15.
- [47](#) For a discussion of the exclusion of indigenous subjects and inclusion of white female subjects in the citizenship of the newly federated Australia, see, for example, Patricia Grimshaw, Marilyn Lake, Ann McGrath, and Marian Quartly, eds., *Creating a Nation, 1788–1900* (Ringwood: McPhee Gribble, 1994) p. 2.
- [48](#) Jane Carey argues that within the Australian women's movement of the 1900s and 1910s, there was remarkably little discussion of the so-called Aboriginal problem. Marilyn Lake asserts that it was the maternalist orientation of the women's movement in inter-war Australia that led feminists there to champion the rights of Aboriginal women, including calling for an end to the removal of Aboriginal children from their mothers, recognition of Aboriginal citizen rights, education, an end to the sexual abuse of indigenous women, and the return of Aboriginal land. See Jane Carey, 'White Anxieties and the Articulation of Race: The Women's Movement and the Making of White Australia, 1910s–1930s', in Jane Carey and Claire McLisky eds., *Creating White Australia* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2009) pp. 195–213, pp. 210–213, and Marilyn Lake, *Getting Equal: The History of Australian Feminism* (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1999) pp. 13–15.
- [49](#) For a discussion of indigenous people and the female franchise, see Oldfield, *Woman Suffrage in Australia*, pp. 64–66.
- [50](#) Duncan S. A. Bell, 'Dissolving Distance: Technology, Space, and Empire in British Political Thought, 1770–1900', *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 77, no. 3 (2005) pp. 523–562.
- [51](#) Stuart Macintyre, *A Concise History of Australia*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) p. 140.
- [52](#) For a discussion of how decolonisation brought the race 'problem' home to Britain, see Evan Smith and Marinella Marmo, *Race, Gender and the Body in British Immigration Control: Subject to Examination* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) pp. 22–44.
- [53](#) Macintyre, *A Concise History of Australia*, pp. 142–143.
- [54](#) Macintyre, *A Concise History of Australia*, pp. 143–145.
- [55](#) Barbara Caine, 'Australian Feminism and the British Militant Suffragettes', Paper presented to the Department of the Senate Occasional Lecture Series at Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, 31 October 2003:

www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/pubs/pops/pop41/caine.pdf, accessed 21 January 2016. For an account of an exchange Goldstein had with a British commentator over the comparative value of the Australian women's and British man's vote, see Sharon Crozier-De Rosa, 'The National and the Transnational in British Anti-Suffragists' Views of Australian Women Voters', *History Australia*, vol. 10, no. 3 (2013) pp. 51–64.

[56](#) Caine, 'Australian Feminism and the British Militant Suffragettes'.

[57](#) See Caine, 'Australian Feminism and the British Militant Suffragettes'.

[58](#) Hilary Fraser, Stephanie Green and Judith Johnston, *Gender and the Victorian Periodical* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 145.

[59](#) Maria DiCenzo, Lucy Delap and Leila Ryan, *Feminist Media History: Suffrage, Periodicals and the Public Sphere* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) p. 2.

[60](#) DiCenzo, Delap and Ryan, *Feminist Media History*, p. 2.

[61](#) DiCenzo, Delap and Ryan, *Feminist Media History*, p. 13.

[62](#) DiCenzo, Delap and Ryan, *Feminist Media History*, p. 3.

[63](#) Feminist nationalist prioritised their feminists aspirations over their nationalist ones, whereas nationalist feminists prioritised their nationalist aspirations over their feminists objectives. Both subscribed to feminist and nationalist politics; they just varied in the order of priority.

[64](#) DiCenzo, Delap and Ryan asserts, 'One need only see how often the *Anti-Suffrage Review* or other monthly reviews like the *New Age* regularly cited suffrage organs and other feminist publications to appreciate how closely opponents and other observers monitored movement media.' See DiCenzo, Delap, and Ryan, *Feminist Media History*, p.83.

[65](#) DiCenzo, Delap and Ryan, *Feminist Media History*, p.78.

[66](#) See the first edition of the *Anti-Suffrage Review*, no. 1, December 1908, pp. 1–2

[67](#) Julia Bush, 'National League for Opposing Woman Suffrage (act. 1910–1918)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, online ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) www.oxforddnb.com/view/theme/92492, accessed 13 November 2011.

[68](#) Bush, 'National League for Opposing Woman Suffrage'.

[69](#) Bush, 'National League for Opposing Woman Suffrage'.

[70](#) See Brian Harrison, *Separate Spheres: The Opposition to Women's Suffrage in Britain* (London: Croom Helm, 1978) pp. 13–24.

[71](#) Julia Bush, *Women Against the Vote: Female Suffragism in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) p. 2.

[72](#) See, for example, Valeria Sanders, *Eve's Renegades: Victorian Anti-Feminist Women Novelists* (London: Macmillan Press, 1996); Julia Bush, 'British Women's Anti-Suffragism and the Forward Policy, 1908–14', *Women's History Review*, vol. 11, no. 3 (2002) pp. 431–454; Lucy Delap, 'Feminist and Anti-Feminist Encounters in Edwardian Britain', *Historical Research*, vol. 78, no. 201 (2005) pp. 377–399; Bush, *Women Against the Vote*; and David Thackeray, 'Home and Steele Politics: Women and Conservatism Activism in Early Twentieth-Century Britain', *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 49, no. 4 (2010) pp. 826–848. See also Tamara S. Wagner, 'Introduction: Narratives of Victorian Antifeminism', in Tamara S. Wagner, ed., *Antifeminism and the Victorian Novel: Rereading Nineteenth-Century Women Writers* (Amherst, New York: Cambria Press, 2009) pp. 1–15.

[73](#) For recent works examining the women's press in Ireland around this time, see C. L. Innes, 'A Voice in Directing the

Affairs of Ireland”: *L’Irlande Libre*, *The Shan Van Vocht* and *Bean na h-Eireann*’, in Paul Hyland and Neil Sammells, eds., *Irish Writing: Exile and Subversion* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991) pp. 146–158; Louise Ryan, ‘The Irish Citizen, 1912–1920’, *Saothar*, vol. 17 (1992) pp. 105–111; Karen Steele, *Women, Press and Politics During the Irish Revival* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2007); Sonja Tiernan, ‘Tabloid Sensationalism or Revolutionary Feminism? The First-Wave Feminist Movement in an Irish Women’s Periodical’, *Irish Communications Review*, vol. 12, no. 1 (2010) pp. 74–87; and Brittany Columbus, ‘*Bean na h-Éireann*: Feminism and Nationalism in an Irish Journal, 1908–1911’, *Voces Novae: Chapman University Historical Review*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2009) pp. 3–30.

[74](#) This was pronounced in an editorial by Helena Moloney later in the journal’s life. See Innes, ‘“A Voice in Directing the Affairs of Ireland”’, p. 146.

[75](#) Steele, *Women, Press, and Politics During the Irish Revival*, p.109.

[76](#) Steele, *Women, Press, and Politics During the Irish Revival*, p.110. For a discussion of the complex nature of the so-called Celtic Revival—one feature of which was the mentioned adoption of Celtic personae—see, among others: Declan Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland: The Literature of the Modern Nation* (London: Vintage, 1996); and Gregory Castle, *Modernism and the Celtic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[77](#) Murphy, *The Women’s Suffrage Movement and Irish Society in the Early Twentieth Century*, p. 29.

[78](#) Murphy, *The Women’s Suffrage Movement and Irish Society in the Early Twentieth Century*, pp. 32–34.

[79](#) For example, organisers Francis and Hanna Sheehy Skeffington had university degrees. Hanna had a master’s degree and taught at a girl’s school (a position she lost after being imprisoned during the militant part of the movement). Margaret Cousins was awarded a music degree and went on to teach music. There were three professors in the movement: Professor Mary Halden, first woman professor of Irish History; Professor Oldham; and Professor Tom Kettle. See Murphy, *The Women’s Suffrage Movement and Irish Society in the Early Twentieth Century*, p. 29.

[80](#) See Murphy, *The Women’s Suffrage Movement and Irish Society in the Early Twentieth Century*, p. 34.

[81](#) Murphy, *The Women’s Suffrage Movement and Irish Society in the Early Twentieth Century*, p. 76.

[82](#) Australian Women’s National League, *History of the Australian Women’s National League*, 50th Anniversary Publication, Melbourne, 1954, p. 4.

[83](#) Marian Simms, ‘Conservative Feminism in Australia: A Case Study of Feminist Ideology’, *Women’s Studies International Quarterly*, vol. 2, no. 3 (1979) pp. 305–318, p. 306.

[84](#) Eva Hughes’s claim was that it was the largest body globally. Quoted in Marian Quartly, ‘Defending “The Purity of Home Life” Against Socialism: The Founding Years of the Australian Women’s National League’, *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 50, no. 2 (2004) pp. 178–193, p. 178, and Judith Smart, ‘Hughes, Agnes Eva (1856–1940)’, *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hughes-agnes-eva-6755/text11675>, published first in hardcopy 1983, accessed online 29 May 2017.

[85](#) Judith Smart, ‘Eva Hughes: Militant Conservative’, in Marilyn Lake and Farley Kelly, eds., *Double Time: Women in Victoria—150 years* (Melbourne: Penguin, 1985) pp. 179–189.

[86](#) *Woman*, vol. 1, no. 1, 21 September 1907, pp. 4–5.

[87](#) *Woman*, vol. 1, no. 1, 21 September 1907, pp. 4–5.

[88](#) *Woman*, vol. 1, no. 10, 25 June 1908, p. 233.

[89](#) *Woman*, vol. 1, no. 1, 21 September 1907, pp. 4–5.

[90](#) The Australian paper, the *Woman*, refers to the Irish Catholic ‘problem’ once the war commences and some Irish-Australians show allegiance to Irish nationalism and oppose moves for conscription for wartime service. Although Australia had no established religion, the many different Protestant denominations dominated the religious scene at this time. (For a brief discussion of the Australian religious scene just before the turn of the twentieth century, see Macintyre, *A Concise History of Australia*, pp. 115–117.) Irish nationalist and Unionist women were largely Catholic, Anglican, or Presbyterian, if they were members of any religious organisation. Here, too, in the papers I look at, religion was rarely specified in the interests of championing gender and national politics over sectarian divisions. Certainly, Christian values direct much of the *Review*’s sentiments in a religiously diverse Britain. For a brief discussion of the religious scene in Britain, see François Bédarida, *A Social History of England 1851–1990*, translated by A. S. Forster and Geoffrey Hodgkinson (London and New York: Routledge, 1990) pp. 85–92.

[91](#) See Frank Biess, Alon Confino, Ute Frevert, Uffa Jensen, Lyndal Roper, and Daniela Saxer, Forum: ‘History of Emotions’, *German History*, vol. 28, no. 1 (2010) pp. 67–80, especially pp. 79–80.